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The Second Circuit Correctly Interprets the
Alien Tort Statute: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
FRANK CRUz-ALVAREZ* & LAURA E. WADE**
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 17, 2010, the Second Circuit surprised the legal
community by holding in a divided panel that the Alien Tort Statute
("ATS") does not provide jurisdiction for corporations in United States
Courts.' In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,2 the families of seven
Nigerians "who were executed by a former military government for pro-
testing Shell's exploration and development"' brought suit against the
oil company for violations of human rights under the Alien Tort Stat-
ute.4 Shell denied accusations of involvement in human rights abuses.'
Kiobel sent shock waves through the legal community, as the Second
Circuit turned away from its past precedent and that of three other cir-
cuits to find that the ATS does not provide jurisdiction over corporate
defendants.6
The Eleventh Circuit was one such circuit that explicitly held that
corporations could be liable under the ATS.7 This article will argue that
the Second Circuit was correct in its analysis that the ATS does not
* Frank Cruz-Alvarez is a partner in the Miami office of Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP. He is
a member of the firm's global products liability litigation group and its international litigation and
dispute resolution group.
** Laura E. Wade is an associate at Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P. She practices in the area
of global product liability litigation.
1. Court Dismisses Rights Case Against Shell, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 17, 2010, http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/09/18/business/energy-environmentll8tort.html.
2. 621 F.3d Ill (2d Cir. 2010).
3. Id. at 123.
4. Id.; see also U.S. Appeals Court Declines to Rehear Case re Shell in Nigeria, REUTERS
LEGAL, Feb. 4, 2011, available at http://westlawnews.thomson.com/NationalLitigation/News/
2011/02_-_February/US appealscourtdeclinesto_rehearcase_re_Shell-inNigeria/.
5. Court Dismisses Rights Case Against Shell, supra note 1.
6. See, e.g., Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that
while ATS cases "initially involved state actors violating the law of nations," ATS cases now also
impose "liability on private individuals and corporations"); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163
(2d Cir. 2009); Abagninin v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2008); Romero v.
Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008); Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v.
Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d
254 (2d Cir. 2007); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 473 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242
(11th Cir. 2005); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003).
7. See Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315 (11th Cir. 2008).
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provide jurisdiction for corporate defendants. It will advocate that the
Eleventh Circuit adopt the same reasoning. Section II of this article will
provide the background of the ATS and the importance of Kiobel to
ATS jurisprudence. Section III will discuss Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
and its importance to the issue of corporate liability under the ATS. Sec-
tion IV will outline the three main Second Circuit cases addressing this
issue: Khulumani v. Barclay, Presbyterian Church v. Talisman, and
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum. Presbyterian Church came before the
Second Circuit around the same time as Kiobel and also addressed the
issue of corporate liability under the ATS.8 Section V of this article will
discuss Romero v. Drummond and Eleventh Circuit precedent regarding
corporate liability under the ATS. Section VI of this article will con-
clude by emphasizing why the Second Circuit was correct in determin-
ing that the ATS does not provide jurisdiction to corporate defendants.
II. BACKGROUND: THE IMPORTANCE OF KioBEL TO
ATS JURISPRUDENCE
The First Congress of the United States passed the ATS in 1789.1 It
reads: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."10 Despite its passage in 1789,
the ATS lay dormant in the United States courts until fairly recently."
In 1981, the Second Circuit gave new life to the ATS in Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala.12 Essentially, the Second Circuit outlined that the ATS pro-
vides jurisdiction over "(1) tort actions, (2) brought by aliens (only), (3)
for violations of the law of nations (aka 'customary international law')
including, as a general matter, war crimes and crimes against human-
ity-crimes in which the perpetrator can be called 'hostis humani
generis. ""'
The Filartiga panel of the Second Circuit explained the background
8. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 79; 131 S. Ct. 122 (2010).
9. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2010); Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2010).
11. See Mark Hamblett, 2nd Circuit Rejects Corporate Liability in Alien Tort Cases,
LAW.COM (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202472226419; Kyle
Whitmire, Alabama Company is Exonerated in Murders at Colombian Mine, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/27/business/27drummond.html.
12. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878 (holding that "deliberate torture perpetrated under color of
official authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights.").
This was the case that began the "modem line" of ATS cases. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
13. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116 (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878).
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of the passage of the ATS: There were thirteen colonies fused into a new
nation, "bound both to observe and construe the accepted norms of inter-
national law," also known as the law of nations." "Implementing the
constitutional mandate for national control over foreign relations, the
First Congress established original district court jurisdiction over 'all
causes where an alien sues for a tort only (committed) in violation of the
law of nations.' "i5 This need to regulate and enforce accepted norms of
international law drove the First Congress to pass the ATS.
In Filartiga, the Second Circuit outlined the constitutionality of the
ATS by noting that the "constitutional basis for the Alien Tort Statute is
the law of nations, which has always been part of the federal common
law." 6 The Second Circuit panel further noted that "courts must inter-
pret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has been evolved
and exists among the nations of the world today.""
Filartiga opened the floodgates for ATS claims, first against indi-
viduals, and then against corporations and other private actors.' 8 Since
Filartiga, a variety of plaintiffs have filed and prosecuted many ATS-
based claims in U.S. District Courts.19 That said, despite an increase in
district court litigation, there are relatively few appellate court decisions,
and only one Supreme Court decision, that discuss the ATS in depth.
Indeed, it was not until 2004 that the Supreme Court issued its first ATS
opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.2 0 This decision made it clear that
questions concerning the scope of liability under the ATS, including
whether such liability extends to a particular defendant, are governed by
international law.
The Second Circuit has always been at the forefront of ATS litiga-
tion. Therefore, it is no surprise that it was the first circuit to tackle the
14. Filartiga, 630 F.3d at 877 (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77
(1789) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2010)).
15. Id. at 878.
16. Id. at 885.
17. Id. at 881.
18. See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116 & n.5 (noting that the first lawsuit brought under the ATS
against a corporation was Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), affd in part
and rev'd in part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002)).
19. See id. at 116 (noting that since Filartiga, "the ATS has given rise to an abundance of
litigation in U.S. district courts"). See also Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263
(llth Cir. 2009); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); Abagninin v. AMVAC
Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2008); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (1 Ith Cir.
2008); Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir.
2008); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'1 Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007); Sarei v. Rio Tinto,
PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2007);
Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005); Flores v. S. Peru
Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003).
20. 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (holding that the ATS is only jurisdictional and does not in and
of itself create a cause of action).
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issue of corporate liability under the ATS head-on. Just as Filartiga
changed the landscape of ATS jurisprudence, the Kiobel opinion will
also change the face of ATS jurisprudence in the United States. As other
circuits and the Supreme Court have followed Second Circuit ATS juris-
prudence after Filartiga, they should also continue to follow the Second
Circuit and decide that ATS jurisdiction is limited to states and
individuals.
III. SOSA
The Supreme Court's sole ruling addressing the ATS came in Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain.21 A group of Mexican nationals, including defen-
dant Jose Francisco Sosa, seized plaintiff Humberto Alvarez-Machain
pursuant to a United States Drug Enforcement Agency plan to bring
Alvarez-Machain into the United States to try him for torture. 2 2 Alvarez-
Machain was ultimately acquitted, and in 1993, after his return to Mex-
ico, he filed suit in United States District Court pursuant to the Federal
Tort Claims Act and the ATS.2 3 The District Court granted summary
judgment and awarded damages on the ATS claim. 24 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the ATS judgment. When ruling again en banc, it also noted
that the ATS "creates a cause of action for an alleged violation of the
law of nations." 25
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ATS is "in terms
only jurisdictional" and enables federal courts to hear claims based on
the law of nations. 26 Notably, in a footnote, the Court pointed towards
the issue of corporate liability, stating that "[a] related consideration is
whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of
a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private
actor such as a corporation or an individual." 27 While the Court noted
the issue, it provided no further commentary or resolution. Courts were
still left to grapple with whether or not the ATS provided jurisdiction for
corporate actors. This lack of clarity was most apparent in the Second
Circuit.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 697-701.
23. Id. at 698.
24. Id. at 699.
25. Id. (quoting Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 612 (9th Cir. 2003) (en
banc), rev'd sub nom. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 712.
27. Id. at 733 n.20 (emphasis added).
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IV. SECOND CIRCUIT CASES
The Second Circuit has entertained numerous ATS claims.2 8 In
these cases, the Second Circuit panels generally assumed that the ATS
applied to corporations. 29 Three main cases demonstrate how the Second
Circuit has dealt with corporate liability under the ATS throughout the
last thirty years. In Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., the Second
Circuit grappled with the issue of corporate liability without ultimately
issuing a decision.3 0 The Second Circuit, however, was recently con-
fronted with the issue of corporate liability under the ATS in two recent
cases where the defendants specifically pled and argued that United
States courts do not have jurisdiction over corporate defendants under
the ATS. In the first case, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc." the court avoided addressing the corporate liability issue
because it was able to affirm the lower court's summary judgment in
favor of the defendant, Talisman Energy, Inc., without addressing the
underlying subject matter jurisdiction issue. In the second case, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch, the court could no longer avoid addressing the issue of
corporate liability. The case came before the Second Circuit following
the lower court's ruling, which granted in part and denied in part the
defendants' motion to dismiss. Recognizing that the issue of corporate
liability under the ATS remained unresolved, the district court certified
its order for interlocutory appeal. As such, the issue of corporate liability
was squarely in front of the panel, and the Panel had no choice but to
decide it.
A. Khulumani v. Barclay
In Khulumani, the Second Circuit heard an appeal from the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, where plain-
tiffs pled that a group of corporate defendants had "actively and will-
ingly collaborated with the government of South Africa" in maintaining
a system of apartheid in violation of international law.32 The District
Court held that plaintiffs failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction
28. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); Vietnam Ass'n for
Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008); Khulumani v. Barclay
Nat'l. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007); Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d
233 (2d Cir. 2003).
29. See Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 163; Vietnam Ass'n, 517 F.3d at 104; Khulumani, 504 F.3d at
254; Flores, 414 F.3d at 233.
30. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 254. As discussed earlier, the ATS was largely dormant until the
Second Circuit opinion of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
31. 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009).
32. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 258.
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under the ATS and dismissed the lawsuit." On appeal, two of the Judges
joined to reverse dismissal of the ATS claims, ruling that aider and abet-
tor violations can provide a basis for ATS jurisdiction.3 4 Significantly,
the defendants did not raise the issue of corporate liability, however,
each of the three judges that comprised the panel expressed a different
view on the issue of corporate liability under the ATS. 5 Judge
Katzmann first stated in his concurring opinion that because the issue
was not pled, the Court would not reach it. He then expressed his opin-
ion that jurisdiction to entertain an ATS claim depended upon whether
the alleged tort was "committed in violation of the law of nations, and
whether this law would recognize the defendant's responsibility for that
violation."3 6 He added that the Second Circuit has "repeatedly treated
the issue of whether corporations may be held liable under the [ATS] as
indistinguishable from the question of whether private individuals may
be."3 Judge Hall stated in his concurrence that corporate defendants
should be liable under the ATS. 8 Finally, Judge Korman, concurring in
part and dissenting in part, concluded that corporate actors should not be
liable under the ATS because international law does not recognize cor-
porate liability."1 After conducting an exhaustive review of international
law sources, Judge Korman further noted that "because the established
norm during the apartheid era was that corporations were not responsible
legally for violations of norms prescribing crimes against humanity, the
complaints are subject to dismissal on this ground alone."4 0
B. Presbyterian Church v. Talisman
In this case, a group of Sudanese people filed suit against Talisman
Energy, Inc., claiming that they were "victims of human rights abuses
committed by the Government of Sudan in Khartoum," and that Talis-
man "aided and abetted or conspired with the government" in the com-
mission of these abuses. 4 1 Before the decision in the District Court
proceedings, defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing
that the court should consider, after Sosa 42 and the Second Circuit's
33. Id. at 259.
34. Id. at 260.
35. Id. at 282 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 270 (internal citation omitted).
37. Id. at 282.
38. Id. at 289 (Hall, J., concurring) ( "I share Judge Katzmann's understanding ... that ...
corporate actors are subject to liability under the [ATS].").
39. Id. at 326 (Korman, J., dissenting).
40. Id.
41. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 79; 131 S. Ct. 122 (2010).
42. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
1114 [Vol. 65:1109
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decision in Flores,43 whether the ATS provides jurisdiction for corporate
liability." The District Court denied the motion, and the case pro-
ceeded.45 Defendant Talisman moved for summary judgment on all
claims.46
Plaintiffs claimed that Talisman violated the customary interna-
tional law relating to genocide, torture, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities and their
property. Additionally, plaintiffs argued that Talisman conspired with
and aided and abetted its sole co-defendant, the Republic of Sudan, to
commit those same violations of customary international law.47 The
plaintiffs did not oppose the motion for summary judgment as to Talis-
man's direct liability, therefore the only issue was whether Talisman
was entitled to summary judgment on the claims of conspiring with and
aiding and abetting the government.48
The District Court found that the Sudanese residents failed to allege
a sufficient conspiracy claim under the ATS,49 and that the residents
failed to establish aider and abettor liability for genocide,o for crimes
against humanity,"' and for war crimes.52 Plaintiffs appealed from this
decision to the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit heard arguments from the parties on January
12, 2009-the same day the Circuit heard arguments in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co.5 4 Notably, the Second Circuit panel requested and
received post-argument briefing on the issue of corporate liability under
the ATS from both parties in the Talisman case." In the opinion
43. Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003).
44. Presbyterian Church, 582 F.3d at 251.
45. Id.
46. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633, 662
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
47. Presbyterian Church, 582 F.3d at 251.
48. Presbyterian Church, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 662.
49. Id. at 664-65 (noting that "liability under the ATS for ... conspiracy may only attach
where the goal of the conspiracy was either to commit genocide or to commit aggressive war.").
50. Id. at 668-70 (stating that to survive summary judgment on a claim of genocide, there
must be "evidence not only that genocide was occurring," but that defendant understood that and
defendant intended his acts to facilitate genocide).
51. Id. at 670-71 (noting that Plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence of crimes
against humanity).
52. Id. at 671.
53. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 79; 131 S. Ct. 122 (2010).
54. Id at 245; Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
55. Petition for Writ of Certorari, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.,
131 S. Ct. 79 (2010) (No. 09-1262) at 10 (citing Petitioner's Reply Brief, Presbyterian Church of
Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 79 (2010) (No. 09-1262); Talisman Energy, Inc. v.
Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 131 S. Ct. 122 (2010) (No. 09-1418)).
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affirming the dismissal, however, the Second Circuit did not discuss the
substance of whether corporations can be held liable under the ATS.
Instead, the opinion focused on the plaintiffs failure to meet their bur-
den of proof on the substantial assistance claim under the ATS. 5 6
Because the Talisman panel was reviewing an order granting summary
judgment, the panel was able to render a decision based on the substan-
tive evidentiary issue, without addressing the underlying issue of subject
matter jurisdiction.
Demonstrating a desire to have the issue of corporate liability under
the ATS addressed, when the plaintiff, Presbyterian Church, filed a Writ
of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, Talisman filed a Con-
ditional Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certiorari focused primarily on the
underlying subject matter jurisdiction issues. The first issue listed and
briefed in Talisman's Conditional Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari
was whether "federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction under the
Alien Tort Statute to impose liability on corporations for torts commit-
ted in violation of customary international law, given that no interna-
tional law norm recognizing corporate liability has been 'accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features
of the 18th-century paradigms [this Court has] recognized. " 5
Talisman's brief first cites Sosa, noting that Sosa did not address
whether or not corporate actors may be liable under the ATS, but that it
did state that matters concerning the scope of liability under the ATS are
governed by international law." The brief then mentions the Second
Circuit's decision in Khulumani v. Barclay Ltd.-5 to demonstrate that
this issue has been raised in other cases and that lower courts have
avoided addressing it head on and expressed contradictory views that
need to be reconciled. Talisman goes on to explain in its brief that the
56. Presbysterian Church, 582 F.3d at 247.
57. Conditional Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certorari, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
Talisman Energy, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 79 (2010) (No. 09-1262), at (i) Questions Presented (quoting
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004)). The other issues presented and briefed were
whether federal courts "lack subject matter jurisdiction to apply the Alien Tort Statute
extraterritorially to claims for violations of customary international law arising entirely outside the
United States" and whether there is no ATS cause of action where "(i) the claims are based on
events arising solely outside the United States and had no effect on the United States whatsoever,
(ii) the claims are asserted against a foreign defendant not in the custody of the United States and
(iii) a country providing an adequate alternative forum has a close nexus to the dispute." Id. In the
third issue, it is noteworthy that the country with an adequate alternative forum and a close nexus
in this instance was Canada, as Talisman is a Canadian company. The Canadian government and
United States State Department were involved in the proceedings of Talisman.
58. Id. (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20 ("[a] related consideration is whether international
law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if
the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.").
59. 504 F.3d 254 (2d. Cir. 2007).
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Second Circuit panel in Talisman requested and received post-argument
briefing on the issue of corporate liability, yet declined to reach the
question.60 They then further explain why: because the Panel assumed,
without deciding, that corporations can be liable under the ATS. 6 1 The
Panel thought this was appropriate because they found that plaintiffs'
claims failed on other grounds.62
In further deference to the Supreme Court guidelines, the brief cites
Sosa's guidelines: ATS jurisdiction extends only to "a narrow class of
claims based on 'norm[s] of international character accepted by the civi-
lized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of
the 18th-century paradigms' of violation of safe conducts, infringement
of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy."63 The brief then states the
question presented here, in light of Sosa: "whether there is a consensus
among States, demonstrable with all the certainty that Sosa requires, that
liability for violations of customary international law extends to corpora-
tions."' The defendants argued that there is no such consensus, for
numerous reasons.
First, no international tribunal has held a corporation liable for vio-
lating customary international law. No organizational charter has ever
granted such a tribunal jurisdiction to do so. Rather, jurisdiction of inter-
national tribunals has been expressly limited to natural, not corporate,
persons. 65 The London Charter that established the International Mili-
tary Tribunal at Nuremberg established jurisdiction over persons acting
as individuals or as members of organizations; not "over claims asserted
against organizations or juridical persons."66 The International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda also limited jurisdiction to "natural persons."6 7 The
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, with 148 signatories,
likewise provided only for jurisdiction over natural persons. 8 During
the passage of the Rome statute, the parties debated whether or not juris-
diction should extend to juridical persons, but there was no consensus
between the states. 69 The brief also cites the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment-the
Torture Convention-which, by its terms, extends only to natural per-
60. Conditional Cross Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 57, at 10.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at II (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.)
64. Id.
65. Id. at 12.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 12-13.
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sons.70 Because of this, the United States Torture Victim Protection Act,
passed to implement the Torture Convention, states that "individuals"
are capable of violating the statute and "individuals" are those who are
subject to torture (implying that it refers solely to natural persons).
Finally, defendants also mention a twenty-eight country survey carried
out on Talisman's behalf after the Second Circuit requested post-argu-
ment briefing, which uncovered no judicial decisions recognizing corpo-
rate liability. 2
Despite the thorough briefing, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari."
C. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Plaintiffs in this case were "residents of Nigeria who claimed that
Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations, engaged in oil exploration
and production, aided and abetted the Nigerian government in commit-
ting violations of the law of nations."74 The plaintiffs filed a class action
in 2002 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. The defendants in this case were Royal Dutch and Shell.
Plaintiffs alleged that, through a subsidiary named "Shell Petroleum
Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd. ("SPDC"), the Defendants
aided and abetted the Nigerian government in committing human rights
abuses directed at plaintiffs."" All defendants were corporate entities,
also known as "juridical" entities.7 6
While the SPDC engaged in oil exploration and production in
Nigeria, the Nigerian people organized a response movement to protest
the environmental damage. The plaintiffs alleged that the SPDC enlisted
the aid of the Nigerian government to suppress the environmental
response movement. Plaintiffs also accused the Nigerian government of
attacking and raping people, destroying property, and looting.7 7 Specifi-
cally, SPDC is alleged to have: "(1) provided transportation to Nigerian
forces, (2) allowed their property to be utilized as a staging ground for
attacks, (3) provided food for soldiers involved in the attacks, and (4)
provided compensation to those soldiers.""
70. Id. at 13.
7 1. Id.
72. Id. at 14.
73. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 79; 131 S. Ct. 122 (2010).
74. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2010).
75. Id. at 123.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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The defendants moved to dismiss based on Sosa.79 The District
Court dismissed the action in September of 2006, only with respect to
the claims based on property destruction, forced exile, extrajudicial kill-
ing, and violations of the rights to life, liberty, security, and association.
The District Court held that customary international law did not define
those violations with the particularity required by Sosa.so The court,
however, denied the motion to dismiss with respect to arbitrary arrest
and detention, crimes against humanity, and torture or cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment.8 ' The District Court then certified the entire
order for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 USC 1292(b)."
The Second Circuit heard arguments on January 12, 2009,3 the
same day they heard arguments in Talisman. The panel rendered their
decision on September 17, 2010.84 In stark contrast to the Talisman
opinion, which ignored the issue of corporate liability, the Kiobel major-
ity, comprised of Judge Cabranes and Judge Jacobs, admitted that corpo-
rate liability was an "unresolved" ATS issue that the Second Circuit had
left "unanswered."" Judge Cabranes, writing for the majority, further
admitted that the Second Circuit has not directly addressed the "lurking"
issue of whether a corporation can be liable under the ATS for violations
of customary international law.8"
In its introduction, the majority briefly identifies the facts relevant
to the litigation. Then, they note the difficulty of their decision: U.S.
legal culture routinely holds corporations civilly liable in tort, so how
could corporations not be civilly liable in tort under the ATS?8 ' After
outlining Sosa's requirement-that the ATS provides limited jurisdic-
tion over "a limited number of offenses defined by customary interna-
tional law"" -the majority explains that this examination requires the
court to look beyond domestic law and examine "specific and univer-
sally accepted rules that the nations of the world treat as binding in their
dealings with one another."8 9 Therefore, because Sosa requires the
Court to look to international law, the fact that corporations can be held
79. Id. at 124.
80. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 464-67 (S.D.N.Y.2006).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 467-68.
83. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 111.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 117 n.10.
86. Id. at 124.
87. Id. at 117-18.
88. Id. at 118 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (emphasis
removed)).
89. Id.
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liable in our domestic tort law does not mean that the ATS confers juris-
diction over corporations.
Also within the introduction, the majority notes that the "singular
achievement of international law since the Second World War has come
in the area of human rights.""o Looking to human rights developments,
they cite the Nuremberg trials, noting that "the principle of individual
liability for violations of international law has been limited to natural
persons" because the moral responsibility for such heinous crimes is an
individual issue.91 They then outline other international tribunals, post-
Nuremberg, that have found liability for human rights abuses only
individually.9 2
To conclude their introduction, the majority states its holding, that
"insofar as plaintiffs bring claims under the ATS against corporations,
plaintiffs fail to allege violations of the law of nations, and plaintiffs'
claims fall outside the limited jurisdiction provided by the ATS."9 '
Therefore, the ATS does not provide a forum for suits against corporate
Defendants, who are immune from suit under the ATS. There simply is
no international law norm under which corporations can be civilly liable
in tort law.94
In its discussion, the majority provides a two-step analysis. First,
the court should ask whether international or domestic law governs the
question.95 Second, the court should ask what the sources of interna-
tional law reveal with respect to whether corporations can be subject to
liability for violations of customary international law. 96 The majority
then proceeds to the first step: Which body of law governs-interna-
tional or domestic?
Based on Supreme Court precedent found in Sosa, the majority
answers the first question: Customary international law, also called the
law of nations, governs ATS inquiries." At the time of the passage of
the ATS, in 1789, there were three specific offenses against the law of
nations: safe conducts, infringement of rights of ambassadors, and
piracy.9 8 Following, however, the reasoning in Sosa, courts may now
recognize claims based on the present day law of nations, if the claims
rest on norms of international character accepted by the civilized world
90. Id.
91. Id. at 119.
92. Id. (citing the design of the International Criminal Court and the Rome Statute).
93. Id. at 120.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 125.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 125-26.
98. Id. at 125.
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and defined with specificity.9 9
Furthermore, in Sosa itself, the Supreme Court stated that courts
must look to "whether international law extends the scope of liability for
a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defen-
dant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual."" Since
Sosa, the majority writes, courts must look to "customary international
law to determine both whether certain conduct leads to ATS liability and
whether the scope of liability under the ATS extends to the defendant
being sued."' 0 '
Using this logic, the majority acknowledges that at first blush, it
seems that corporations could be liable under the ATS, since they are
liable in tort under the domestic law of the United States.102 The major-
ity, however, goes on to explain that:
[b]y conferring subject matter jurisdiction over a limited number of
offenses defined by international law, the ATS requires federal courts
to look beyond rules of domestic law-however well-established
they may be-to examine the specific and universally accepted rules
that the nations of the world treat as binding in their dealings with
one another.'0 3
With this baseline established, the majority proceeds to the second prong
of the analysis: Whether sources of international law reveal that corpora-
tions can be liable under the ATS.
To guide the second prong analysis, the majority notes that custom-
ary international law includes only "those standards, rules, or customs
(a) affecting the relationship between states or between an individual
and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for their common good
and/or dealings inter se."'I A common good in this context is a treaty.
Where there is no treaty, controlling executive or legislative act, or judi-
cial decision, one must look to the customs and usages of civilized
nations.' Furthermore, to attain the status of a rule of customary inter-
national law, a norm must be specific, universal, and obligatory. 0 6
The majority looks to Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, which says the following sources apply in international
law: (1) international conventions; (2) international custom; (3) general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and (4) judicial deci-
99. Id. at 125-26.
100. Id. at 126 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004)).
101. Id. at 128.
102. Id. at 117.
103. Id. at 118.
104. Id. at 118 (citing 1IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J.)).
105. Id. at 131 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733-34).
106. Id.
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sions & teachings of the most highly qualified publicists.'07 The major-
ity proceeds to analyze each source.
Regarding international conventions, also called international tribu-
nals, none have ever held a corporation liable for a violation of the law
of nations. 0 The London Charter, which established the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, granted the Tribunal jurisdiction over
natural persons only.'" United States Military tribunals prosecuted Cor-
porate Executives, but not the corporations themselves. 10 Specifically,
the majority noted that the Tribunal refused to hold the I.G. Farben
Chemical Company liable."' Other International Tribunals continually
declined to hold corporations liable, including both the International Tri-
bunal for Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.1"2 Furthermore, the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court limits that tribunal's jurisdiction to
"natural persons,"" 3 even though France proposed to hold corporations
liable during the passage of the Rome Statute."14
Looking to international custom and general principles, the major-
ity noted that they are essentially contractual obligations between
states." As such, international custom is sufficient proof of customary
international law only if a significant number of people have ratified a
relevant treaty." 6 Furthermore, calling something a norm of interna-
tional human rights essentially makes it applicable even to states that
have not ratified the treaty."' Finally, it would be inappropriate to
decide that treaties create a norm of corporate liability when so many
major multilateral treaties expressly reject this notion."'
The majority then addresses another source of international law:
works of publicists. These are a "relevant" source of international
law' 9-two renowned international law professors argued before the
107. Id. at 132.
108. Id. at 132.
109. Id. at 133-34 (citing Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis (the "London Charter") art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 1547).
The London Charter granted the International Military Tribunal the ability to declare
organizations criminal, but only in order to facilitate the prosecution of individuals within. Id. at
134.
110. Id. at 134.
111. Id. at 134-36.
112. Id. at 136.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 137.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 139 (citing The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25, opened for
signature July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1002).
119. Id. at 142.
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panel during Presbyterian Church that "customary international law
does not recognize liability for corporations that violate its norms."1 2 0
In summary, customary international law imposes individual liabil-
ity for a limited number of international crimes. Therefore, applying cus-
tomary international law to the ATS criteria outlined in Sosa, the ATS
provides jurisdiction only over claims in tort against states or individu-
als. The majority notes that "[i]t is inconceivable that a defendant who is
not liable under customary international law could be liable under the
ATS."l 2 1 Therefore, the ATS does not provide jurisdiction over corpo-
rate defendants in tort. The majority concludes that "insofar as plaintiffs
in this action seek to hold only corporations liable for their conduct in
Nigeria (as opposed to individuals within those corporations), and only
under the ATS, their claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction." 2 2 In order to be recognized under the ATS, corporate lia-
bility must achieve universal recognition and acceptance as a norm in
relation to states inter se.123 The majority notes that corporate liability
might "gradually ripen" into a rule of international law, but until that
occurs, corporations cannot be held liable under the ATS 124
1. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch: Concurring Opinion
Many scholars, academics, and human rights groups expressed
alarm over the holding in Kiobel. No critique of the majority, however,
was quite as powerful as Judge Leval's concurring opinion. Judge Leval
sets forth a number of detailed critiques, arguing that the question of
corporate liability under the ATS is not governed by international law.
Judge Leval begins his opinion by suggesting the majority's opinion
gives corporations carte blanche to adopt a corporate form and engage in
whatever heinous activities they so desire, without fear of being found
liable for a human rights violation in the United States under the ATS.125
As discussed further below, Judge Leval greatly exaggerates the impact
of the majority's opinion.
First, he noted that there is "no basis" in the law of nations for the
120. Id. at 143.
121. Id. at 122.
122. Id. at 145.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 149.
125. Much of the summary consists of Judge Leval's prediction of the effect of the majority's
decision: that the most abhorrent conduct-violations of norms of the international law of human
rights-will go unpunished if the perpetrator is a corporation. Judge Leval also highlights that
under the majority's rule, "compensatory damages may be awarded under the ATS against the
corporation's employees . . . but not against the corporation that commanded the atrocities and
earned profits by committing them." Id. (Leval, J., concurring).
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majority's holding.'2 6 He cited the lack of support for their decision: it
was not a precedent of international law, there was no court approval for
it, no international tribunal had declared it to be, no treaty or interna-
tional convention had stated so, and no work of scholarship had declared
it to be so.12 7 Therefore, Judge Leval contended, the majority erred in
looking to international law for guidance to see what bodies and rules
recognize corporate liability.12 8
Second, Judge Leval criticized the majority for looking to interna-
tional criminal tribunals in its analysis, because corporations are never
liable criminally,129 and for contending that international law does not
distinguish between criminal and civil liability.13 0 In the majority's
defense, however, few sources address this issue. Because this is a novel
issue of law, and the ATS necessarily utilizes international law for inter-
pretation, the majority had to utilize whatever international sources they
could find for guidance. Furthermore, Judge Leval does not cite to any
examples of the sources where international law distinguishes between
civil and criminal. Rather, his concurring opinion seems to gloss over
this.
Third, Judge Leval criticized the majority's reliance on an absence
of a universal practice among nations of imposing civil damages on cor-
porations. Judge Leval believes that international law relies on a set of
norms and leaves other questions for nations to resolve for themselves.
Therefore, "[w]hile most nations have not recognized tort liability for
violations of international law, the United States, through the ATS, has
opted to impose civil compensatory liability on violators and draws no
distinction in its laws between violators who are natural persons and
corporations." 13 ' Judge Leval essentially argues that since international
law has not created a norm of whether or not corporations can be civilly
liable, the law of the United States should supplement international law
norms. Under his analysis, because corporations can be held liable for
civil damages in the United States, corporations can also be found liable
under the ATS.
This is a circular argument that the concurrence uses to circumvent
existing precedent. While it is true that United States law does not draw
a distinction between corporations and individuals in civil law, the
Supreme Court stated in Sosa that the ATS provides jurisdiction only,
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 151-52.
130. Id. at 152.
131. Id.
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not a cause of action in and of itself. 3 2 Sosa and other ATS precedent
state that ATS causes of action must be based on international law.' 33
Any attempt to say that international law is then supplemented by the
domestic law of the United States is simply an attempt to bypass Sosa
and other ATS precedent. A Court cannot bypass Sosa by saying that
"international law" is essentially international norms and that domestic
law supplements it. Otherwise, the ATS would create causes of action
for international corporations both under international law and all other
United States laws that "supplement" it-this goes against the statute
itself.
Fourth, to explain the consequences of the majority's opinion,
Judge Leval writes that "because international law generally leaves all
aspects of the issue of civil liability to individual nations, there is no rule
or custom of international law to award civil damages in any form or
context." 134 Therefore "the absence of a universally accepted rule for the
award of civil damages against natural persons means that U.S. courts
may not award damages against a natural person."135 These statements
ignore the fact that, by passing the ATS, the United States Congress
created such a forum. While this is not a part of international law in and
of itself, the legislature has the power to create causes of action in the
courts of the United States.
Following this line of reasoning, Judge Leval states that if we must
look to international law, and it cannot be supplemented by domestic
laws, then there would have been no Nuremberg trials, no subsequent
international tribunals, etc.13 6 This logic is clearly flawed, since the
Nuremberg trials were part of an International Charter. They were not
authorized by the ATS nor brought under the jurisdiction of United
States Courts.
Judge Leval continues, saying that it is improbable that the humani-
tarian law of nations-based in moral judgments reflected in legal sys-
tems throughout the world and seeking to protect fundamental human
rights-would espouse a rule which undermines that objective and lacks
any logical justification.13 7 He explains that the rules of international
law were created by a collective human agency representing the nations
of the world with a purpose to serve desired objectives.138 After Nurem-
berg, these objectives changed and broadened toward "universally
132. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004).
133. Id.
134. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 152 (Leval, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 153.
136. Id. at 153.
137. Id. at 154.
138. Id.
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shared moral objectives."' 39 There are certain universally condemned
acts, however, that the law of nations emphatically opposes.'
Judge Leval split these acts into two categories: where the corpora-
tion itself inflicts humanitarian abuses (slave trade and exploitation,
piracy, and genocide) and where the corporation only aids and abets.14 1
In describing the direct infliction, Judge Leval again compared this to
Nuremberg,' 42 despite his previous objection to the majority's use of
criminal liability situations in the analysis of civil liability. Again, it is
difficult to see the merit of arguments relating to Nuremberg since it was
not brought under the ATS. Regarding the claims where the corporation
only aids and abets, Judge Leval recalled the standard set out in Talis-
man that a corporation must act with a purpose, so that the ATS would
not be overly burdensome to corporations.
The concurrence also pointed out that it is nonsensical for the legal
systems of the world to encourage "establishment of juridical entities"
but "exempt [them] from the law's commands and [immunize them]
from suit."' 43 This does not seem reasonable. Congress creates laws and
the Courts interpret them by applying the current law to factual situa-
tions. Nothing prevents Congress from expanding the ATS or passing
new legislation creating liability for corporations' actions abroad.
Finally, Judge Leval criticizes the majority for relying on Sosa's
footnote written by Justice Souter in dictum, despite the fact that the
majority used the only relevant language from the only ATS decision
ever issued by the Supreme Court.'" Indeed, although Sosa did not
address corporate liability, Justice Souter's footnote is the only Supreme
Court precedent on which lower courts can rely.
Despite the lengthy criticism of the majority opinion, Judge Leval
wrote that the complaint should still be dismissed because the plaintiffs
pled aiding and abetting without pleading a specific purpose, as required
by Talisman.145
2. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch: The Majority's Response to the
Concurring Opinion
The majority briefly addressed Judge Leval's concurrence, both in
their introduction and in a separate section." In the introduction, the
139. Id.
140. Id. at 155.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 160.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 153-54.
146. See id. at 120-21, 145.
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majority responded to Judge Leval's criticism that no precedent of inter-
national law endorses the majority's holding.'4 7 The majority responded
that the responsibility for establishing a norm of international law lies
with the one wishing to invoke it."' 8 Therefore, it was the plaintiffs'
responsibility to establish an international norm of holding a corporation
liable. Since there are not "so many sources of international law calling
for corporate liability," no norm was established and the corporations
cannot be liable under the ATS." 9
Further, when the majority addressed Judge Leval's concurrence in
its own section, they noted that Judge Leval agreed that international law
does not impose liabilities on corporations or other private juridical enti-
ties.15 0 Therefore, Judge Leval was not criticizing the second prong of
their reasoning, but the first prong: that customary international law sup-
plies the rule of decision."5' Indeed, Judge Leval proposed that domestic
law should fill in the gaps where no norm of the law of nations exists. In
doing so, Judge Leval ignored the fact that no governing body has ever
granted an international tribunal jurisdiction over corporations.1 5 2 They
further address his criticisms by saying that Judge Leval has attempted
to shift the burden of identifying a norm of customary international law
to the court, as opposed to the party being sued. 153 Since there is a defi-
nite absence of a norm of corporate liability in customary international
law, the majority was correct.
The majority also noted that Judge Leval dismissed their argument
that international tribunals consistently do not recognize corporate liabil-
ity as a norm of customary international law.154 The majority says that
this distinction between civil and criminal liability is of little conse-
quence, since there is no precedent regarding this distinction.'5 5 Judge
Leval distorted their analysis: Judge Leval claimed the majority held
"that the absence of a universal practice among the law of nations of
imposing civil damages on corporations for violations of international
law means that under international law corporations are not liable for
violations of the law of nations.""' The majority states this is not their
holding.'"' The correct holding is that because corporate liability is not a
147. Id. at 120.
148. Id. at 120-21.
149. Id. at 121.
150. Id. at 145.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 146.
154. Id.
155. Id. (citing Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'1 Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 270 n.5 (2d Cir. 2007)).
156. Id. at 147.
157. Id.
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norm, it cannot be applied in ATS proceedings.'I" Finally, the majority
states that Judge Leval incorrectly categorized who can be liable for vio-
lations of international law as merely a question of remedy indepen-
dently determined by each state.'59 Rather, the majority states, "the
subjects of international law are defined by reference to international
law itself." 6o
The majority also notes that they do not take Judge Leval's passion
for his position lightly.' 1 They note that Judge Leval calls their opinion
illogical, strange, and inconsistent.162 They then say that if their reason-
ing is flawed, it will certainly be corrected by higher judicial
authority.163
3. Rehearing En Banc Denied
On February 4, 2011, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals voted to
deny rehearing en banc.I Judges Lynch, Pooler, Katzmann, and Chin
dissented, noting that the Second Circuit's opinion in Kiobel created a
circuit split with the Eleventh Circuit, citing Romero v. Drummond.165
Judge Katzmann noted in a separate dissent that the Court divided 5-5 as
to whether to proceed to en banc rehearing.166
V. CURRENT ELEVENTH CIRCUIT LAW: ROMERO v. DRumMovD-
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT STILL HOLDS THAT CORPORATIONs ARE
LIABLE UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
In contrast to the Second Circuit, Eleventh Circuit law clearly states
that the ATS provides jurisdiction over corporate defendants. Romero v.
Drummond was an appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama.16 ' The appellate opinion is consolidated
from a number of appeals.16 In one lower court case, the District Court
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 122.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 123.
164. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 06-4800-CV, 06-4876-CV, 2011 WL 338151,
*1 (2d Cir. 2011); see also U.S. Appeals Court Declines to Rehear Case re Shell in Nigeria, supra
note 4.
165. Kiobel, 2011 WL 338151, at *1.
166. Id.
167. See Romero v. Drummond Co., No. CV-03-BE-0575-W, 2006 WL 5186500, at *1 (N.D.
Ala. Apr. 19, 2006).
168. See Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008); Romero v.
Drummond Co., 480 F.3d 1234, 1238 (1lth Cir. 2007). Note that two Eleventh Circuit appellate
decisions exist under the same name. On March 14, 2007, the Eleventh Circuit issued Romero v.
Drummond Co., 480 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2007), a decision concerning consolidated appeals, all
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granted a motion to dismiss on the basis of plaintiffs failure to provide
adequate expert disclosures under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a)(2)(B).16 9 In the other lower court decision cited, plaintiffs sought
damages under the ATS for extrajudicial killings on behalf of all plain-
tiffs, against all defendants. 0 The District Court denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss as to the ATS claims because the union involved in
the litigation was an alien, because it had adequately alleged an actiona-
ble tort for denial of the fundamental rights to associate and organize,
and because it adequately alleged state action."'
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Panel considered "whether execu-
tives of Drummond, Ltd., the Colombian subsidiary of a coal mining
company in Alabama, paid paramilitary operatives to torture and assassi-
nate leaders of a Colombian trade union, SINTRAMIENERGET-
ICA."'7 2 As background, the court explains that in 2002 and 2003, the
Union, several leaders, and the families of deceased union leaders sued
Drummond, Drummond's parent company, and their executives under
the ATS and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991.13 The District
Court consolidated the two cases and granted partial summary judgment
against the plaintiffs. However, "one claim for relief that Drummond
aided and abetted the killings, which were war crimes, remained."17 4
The jury returned a verdict for defendant Drummond."' The plain-
tiffs appealed the partial summary judgment and a series of discovery
and evidentiary rulings made before and during the trial. 17 6 Drummond
appealed as well, to challenge the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Dis-
trict Court.177
The court notes at the beginning of the opinion that they have con-
cluded that the District Court did indeed have subject-matter jurisdiction
under the ATS.178 The Court then continues its discussion and addresses
each issue separately.1 7 9 Regarding partial dismissal: Drummond moved
to dismiss in 2002 because the "union lacked standing to sue for wrong-
dealing with a criminal contempt sanction due to discovery-related issues during the Romero trial.
This opinion does not address any ATS issues. In fact, the entire opinion does not even mention
the ATS.
169. Romero, 2006 WL 5186500, at *1.
170. Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co. Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1255 (N.D. Ala. 2003).
171. Id. at 1265.
172. Romero, 552 F.3d at 1308-09.
173. See id. at 1309.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. Much of this opinion contains discussion related to non-ATS issues (mainly discovery
and evidentiary issues). This article will delve only into the ATS-related portion of the opinion.
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ful death and that corporations are not subject to suit under the Torture
Act."1 s0 "The District Court ruled that the union lacked standing to pur-
sue a wrongful death claim under Alabama law, and that corporations
are subject to suit under [the Torture Act]."'" In addition to discovery
issues, "plaintiffs dismissed their right-to-associate claims under the
Alien Tort Statute . . . [and] [t]he district court concluded that sufficient
evidence supported the claim for aiding and abetting extrajudicial kill-
ings in violation of the Alien Tort Statute."18 2
In its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit panel noted that the court must
review de novo issues of subject-matter jurisdiction.' 8 3 The panel then
addressed Drummond's arguments that: neither the Torture Act nor the
ATS allow suits against corporations; that neither provide claims for aid-
ing and abetting; and "that the Torture Act provides the exclusive cause
of action for extrajudicial killing in violation of international law."184
The Eleventh Circuit first makes it clear that the District Court had
subject-matter jurisdiction, stating that "the arguments of Drummond
about the Alien Tort Statute are foreclosed by our precedent."' The
panel then stated that "the ATS is jurisdictional and does not create an
independent cause of action."186 "The ATS [also] provides jurisdiction
over the plaintiffs' claims for violations of the law of nations."'
The panel noted that although the text of the ATS itself provides no
explicit exception for corporations, that the law of the Eleventh Circuit
"grants jurisdiction from complaints of torture against corporate defend-
ants" and that the court is bound by that precedent.' 8 8 This is the extent
of the discussion regarding corporate liability under the ATS. It stands
in stark contrast to the lengthy analysis seen in the Kiobel. Without fur-
ther discussion and analysis, it almost appears that the Eleventh Circuit
assumed that the ATS permits corporate liability.
VI. CONcLusIoN: WHY THE SECOND CIRCUIT Is RIGHT
We live in an ever-expanding global society where corporations
routinely split into subsidiaries and do business all around the world.
There is a temptation to follow existing assumptions that the ATS pro-
vides jurisdiction over corporations, without looking to the actual text of
180. Id. at 1309-10.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1312.
183. Id. at 1313.
184. Id. at 1314.
185. Id. at 1315.
186. Id. (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004)).
187. Id.
188. Id.
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or correct interpretation of the statute. This is a trap into which our
courts must not fall.
The lengthy majority opinion issued by the Second Circuit in
Kiobel outlines the correct law: The ATS clearly cannot be applied to
corporations because they are not liable under customary international
law. This is not to say that corporations have free reign to act however
they want overseas. The history of the ATS, however, shows that Con-
gress drafted it with the intent to bring customary international law
within the borders of the United States. It was not intended to be a
method for courts to create new liabilities for corporations without
regard to the current international norms.
To remedy situations where corporations are committing human
rights abuses abroad, Congress could certainly pass a new statute
extending jurisdiction for corporations' international actions to the
United States' courts. Until this happens, the Eleventh Circuit and the
other courts in the United States should follow the Second Circuit's
legal reasoning and analysis and hold that the ATS does not create a
cause of action for corporations.
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